Violence Prevention Articles & Essays

Executive Summary:

            Despite differing organizational cultures and political worldviews, it is possible for national militaries and humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to find common ground in the effort to prevent violent conflict.  While mission accomplishment is the bottom line for most professional militaries, doing so at the least possible cost in both lives and treasure is, or should, always be an important consideration.  This is where soldiers and civilian humanitarians can find mutual interests and ways to complement each other.

Wise commanders understand that the most successful army is one that achieves its goals without firing a shot.  Hence, prevention in the realm of violent conflict, as in medicine, should be preferred as cheaper and easier and, in the long term, less likely to foster vengeance and further violence that threaten a victory or cure already realized.  The leadership of civilian non-governmental organizations dedicated to peace and the minimization of human suffering are beginning to realize these goals might be better advanced through coordinating some activities with the military rather than always opposing military operations regardless of their motivations.  This is especially true in parts of the world where “Western” humanitarians are starting to be seen as representing the enemy and where it is impossible for them to do good deeds without some level of armed protection or collaboration with those capable of protecting them.

In some countries, national militaries and NGOs are far ahead of their American counterparts in finding areas of overlapping interests and ways to work together.  There are examples of soldiers regularly being seconded to NGOs for technical activities like demining and others where military schools teach NGOs and journalists how to survive and operate in conflict zones.  Even in the United States, contact and collaboration between the military and civilian humanitarian organizations is on the rise albeit mostly in irregular and ad hoc ways.

It is important and mutually beneficial for soldiers and civilian humanitarians to find new and more institutional ways to collaborate and share their expertise and capabilities in areas where their interests overlap to prevent violent conflict.  To do so, they must explore new opportunities in training and field operations to maximize their success.  This is already beginning in the United States with the establishment of liaison offices, joint conferences and training programs like “Peacegaming.” and “Winning the Peace”.

 

Collaboration Among Military Forces and Non-Governmental Organizations in Preventing Violent Conflict: A Call NOT to Arms

 

Introduction:
            This paper is based on the assumption that American military leaders believe that it is nearly always preferable to win victory at the lowest possible cost in lives and treasure and that they are willing to employ any and all available tools to accomplish the mission at hand.[1]  It also presupposes that one national resource often forgotten or dismissed as irrelevant or unapproachable by them, the non-governmental organization (NGO) community, can be convinced to collaborate in areas where their interests overlap.  This is not a new concept, as the United States Military and American NGOs have often found ways to collaborate in response to natural disasters such as the Pacific Tsunami and recent hurricanes.  There has also been some limited collaboration in post-conflict or stabilization situations as in the Balkans.  New to the game is the notion of collaborating to prevent violent conflict in the first place, something obviously in the interest of both soldiers and civilian humanitarians.  This paper seeks to focus on a few of an increasing number of activities of unofficial and non-governmental actors with which the audience is likely to be unfamiliar.  Since many of these efforts are quite new and innovative, they have generally not yet been reported on outside of the immediate circles of their participants.  The bottom line is that, while NGOs have not very often been considered in discussions of joint operations, many of them are reconsidering their relationships with the Military and exploring new reasons and ways to work together.  The Department of Defense would do well to examine how the NGO community can help it to win without fighting.  

Purpose:

            The purpose of this paper is to discuss briefly some of the ways professional military establishments (in this case that of the United States) and non-governmental organizations can collaborate to achieve a goal that is important to them both- the prevention of violent conflict.  It briefly describes shared characteristics as well as differences between soldiers and civilian humanitarian workers and reasons for them both to embrace and reject collaboration.  It highlights some of the “bridging” activities that are ongoing in the United States and the key players involved.  Finally, it details some specific programs and draws conclusions about how to further promote the process of increased understanding and improved relationships between the United States Military and humanitarian NGOs.

 

Characteristics that both unite and divide:[2]

            There is a vast array of what are collectively termed NGOs or Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) in the United States.  Many work internationally in nearly every imaginable field.  There are those that focus on emergency humanitarian assistance, longer term development, conflict prevention and resolution, governance, human rights, rule of law, education, media, medical and psychological services, and so on.  The list is truly boundless.  They range in size from a handful with thousands of employees and budgets in the hundreds of millions of dollars to little “mom and pop” enterprises scraping by on a shoestring  Many of these organizations can have an impact on military operations and, if successful, may even help to preclude resort to the employment of force. 

            But why should civilian humanitarians care about helping the United States Military save its resources?  Certainly, for most of them, the answer does not lie in aiding mission accomplishment, the soldier’s top priority.  As patriotic as many NGO workers are, few would wish to be characterized as “force multipliers” for the military in its role of promoting national interests.  Their sine qua non, is, however, mitigating human suffering.  And the area of overlapping priorities lies in the realization that helping to prevent violent conflict keeps any military from needing to be employed in reaction.  Once the NGOs come to understand that, at least in democracies, war mongers rarely wear uniforms[3] , it is easier to see their way clear to collaboration.

            Is there anything in the psychological make-up of NGO employees and soldiers that makes it more or less likely they can find a modus vivendi?   After twenty years as a soldier and nearly as long working in or with NGOs, the author has made some completely unscientific observations about similarities and differences that favor or oppose working together.  They basically follow the conclusions of the footnoted video by InterAction et al and can be summarized as those that favor and those that hinder collaboration:

Common Characteristics Favorable to Collaboration

• Dedicated to public service
• Goal-oriented
• Personal courage
• Belief in a good higher than personal gain
• Aggressiveness in achieving the mission

Differences that Hinder Collaboration (Military vs NGO)

• Hierarchically-organized vs De-centralized
• Deference to authority vs Often defiant of authority
• Used to working according to a plan vs Accustomed to improvising

Once NGOs and soldiers get used to working around each other in the field, they usually come to recognize the characteristics they have in common and learn to respect those traits in each other.  It is the differences that take more time and effort to overcome.  If they are honest, most soldiers will admit that they initially view their NGO counterparts as “bleeding-heart, scruffy, disorganized, unprofessional liberal freaks.”  Equal honesty on the part of NGOs would reveal that they initially perceive soldiers as mindless automatons (if not fascist storm troopers) without wills (or spines) who will carry out orders blindly and sometimes brutally regardless of the consequences. [4]   Efforts to overcome these prejudices will be discussed in a later section that discusses cultural bridging efforts.

            Realistically, both militaries and NGOs as organizations have certain advantages and disadvantages when it comes to a shared quest to prevent violent conflict.  The trick is to recognize where each has strengths and weaknesses and to organize in such a way as to maximize the effort toward the common goal.  Sometimes it will be the very differences identified previously that will give one or the other an advantage that can be useful.  For example, NGOs due to their looser organizational structure and lack of deference to authority can often be more flexible in their response to a crisis or opportunity, whereas the military because of its penchant for detailed planning and hierarchical structure, while sometimes less flexible, is better prepared to focus the required resources to solve a problem and has the staying power to see a solution through to the end.  With independence, NGOs often experience a lack of resources and political legitimacy, while the military’s place within the political structure provides huge resources to apply to a situation.  When the two can put their heads together and put aside their prejudices, great things can happen.[5]

            Things for both sides to learn and remember are:

• NGOs are not “herding animals.”  They will not be ordered around, controlled, or even “coordinated.”  Often the best that can be expected is collaboration and sharing of certain kinds of information.
• American soldiers are not unfeeling robots.  They have many characteristics in common with their NGO counterparts and even enjoy humanitarian missions when assigned.
• NGOs must maintain an arms-length distance from military operations, even those of peacekeeping forces.  Traditionally, they have felt their safety depended largely on being seen as separate from the armed combatants. 
• NGOs are not intelligence collectors and no attempt should be made to recruit them as such.  Certain kinds of information such as road conditions and the needs of the civilian populace can and will be freely shared.
• Often, because of their lack of hierarchy and official status, NGOs can go places, do things, and talk to people that are off limits to soldiers.
• While soldiers and their commanders have material resources that NGOs can usually only dream of, they are not at liberty to distribute or make unauthorized use of them, even in a good cause with which they may agree.

With the above points in mind, it is time to discuss what some organizations that see the potential for Military/NGO collaboration are trying to do to overcome the differences and make that potential a reality.

 

Bridging Activities:

            Official players in the United States have long recognized the potential for working with NGOs to prevent violent conflict.[6]  USAID has often been the link between NGOs and the Military, especially in natural disasters through it Offices of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and Transition Initiatives (OTI).  This may even increase with USAID’s newly-formed Military Liaison Office.  President Bush has also established a new State Department Office for the Coordination of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) under Ambassador Carlos Pasquale that is expected to take on a major role for ensuring that all U.S. agencies as well as civil society actors are effectively organized for both post-war reconstruction and stabilization and the prevention of violent conflict.[7]  This paper, however, examines less-official actors who are also taking on the task of bridging the differences between the Military and the NGO community.  Specifically, it discusses some of the activities of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP)[8] in conjunction with InterAction and the Departments of Defense and State and also those of various NGOs.

            The United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C., is accustomed to working with the Department of Defense.  Its published studies have included treatises and handbooks on Military/NGO peace building and conflict resolution efforts.[9]  Annually, USIP awards at least a dozen senior fellowships, and included among every group are one or two U.S. Military officers.  Frequently, senior fellows also include foreign officers who have made a marked contribution to peace keeping or preventing violent conflict.

            Recently, USIP has begun an initiative to build understanding and collaboration among NGOs and the U.S. Military.[10]  In May and July, 2005, representatives from InterAction, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the State Department (S/CRS) and others including NGOs led by InterAction met at USIP with Mike Dziedzic and Beth DeGrasse facilitating.[11]  The purpose of the meetings was to identify and address a slate of mutual concerns.  The focus was on the exchange of information in order to address one of the major priorities: understanding principles that dictate how the various actors – NGOs, military, and diplomats – operate.

            The July meeting resulted in the following recommendations for both NGOs and the Military when operating in non-permissive environments:

Recommendations for the military:

• The military should always be in uniform when conducting relief activities.
• Military visits to NGO sites should be by invitation only and NGO views on the bearing of arms within NGO sites should be respected.
• NGOs should be given the option of meeting with military personnel outside military installations for whatever information exchanges that may occur.
• Emergency assistance and reconstruction programs conducted by the military to further political and/or military objectives should not be described as humanitarian activities.  Relief activities would be more appropriate. From the perspective of most NGOs the only time the military truly are engaged in humanitarian activities in conflict settings is when they are called upon to provide life-saving assistance to local civilians who cannot be reached by the humanitarian community. In such “exceptional circumstances” military provision of humanitarian assistance should be handed over to civilian humanitarian agencies at the earliest possible time.
• NGOs should not be described by the military as “force extenders” or “partners” of the military, or in any other fashion that could compromise popular perceptions of their independence.
• There should be no military interference with NGO services to elements of the civilian population the military may regard as unfriendly.

Recommendations for NGOs:[12]

• NGOs should not serve as implementing partners for the military in conducting relief activities.
• NGOs should not wear military style clothing.
• NGO personnel should not travel in military vehicles.
• NGOs should not have facilities co-located with facilities inhabited by military forces.
• NGOs should use their own logos on clothing, vehicles, and buildings when security conditions permit.
• NGOs should not recreate at military bases where they will be observed by local personnel to be engaged in fraternization with military personnel.

Recommendations on forms of coordination that will not involve unacceptable risk of confusion between military and NGO roles in conflict settings:

• NGO participation in security briefings conducted by the military
• Information sharing on security conditions, operational sites, location of mines and unexploded ordinance, humanitarian activities, and population movements, in so far as such information sharing is for the purpose of facilitating humanitarian operations and the security of staff and local personnel engaged in these operations,
• Liaison arrangements with military commands prior to and during military operations for the purposes of facilitating military operations, including protection of humanitarian installations and personnel, as well as informing military personnel of humanitarian principles and modalities of operation.
• As a last resort, use of military protection for convoys delivering military assistance, taking advantage of essential logistic support available only from the military, accepting evacuation assistance either for medical treatment or to withdraw from a hostile environment.
• Providing technical assistance for “last resort” military humanitarian assistance activities.

This useful round of discussions will continue at USIP, and, without doubt,

the results will be formalized in USIP publications and, perhaps, agreements or memoranda of understanding between the Department of Defense and American NGOs.  At the July meeting, there was a consensus that the timing for the next meeting at the CEO/Flag Officer level might be when the regional commanders are in Washington for a quarterly conference in early 2006.  InterAction said it hoped the current PACOM and CENTCOM participants would be joined by counterparts from EUCOM and SOUTHCOM.

            Another NGO umbrella organization, the Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution (AICPR) and its members and affiliates have also been contributing to Military/NGO understanding in other ways.  In November 2003, AICPR and one of its members, The Peace Studies Program at the University of Wisconsin (Milwaukee) co-sponsored a conference with military and civilian participants titled “New Paths to Peace” out of which grew two projects designed to foster collaboration with the U.S. Military.[13]

The first of these projects, titled “Winning the Peace,” was designed to provide senior cadets at the United States Military Academy (USMA) with a better understanding of the environment in which they will find themselves when they go out into a violent world as young officers.  With a small seed grant from AICPR, the Department of Social Sciences, USMA, The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), and the Center for International Conflict Resolution (CICR) at Columbia University, developed a semester-long curriculum.  The purpose of this curriculum was to give a select group of cadets basic familiarity with international organizations, NGOs, negotiations, cultural differences, civil society and Islam. 

Several AICPR members provided classroom instruction and role-players in the final practical exercise.  One of the AICPR member organizations that provided instruction was the Center for Justice and Peacebuilding at the Eastern Mennonite University in Harrisonburg, Virginia.[14]  The key to this cooperation between AICPR and USMA was the mutual understanding that such training holds the potential for giving Army officers non-lethal tools for accomplishing their mission.  Colonel Mike Meese, Head of the Social Sciences Department, plans to build upon last-year’s pilot program to train an increasing number of senior cadets every year. 

The vision of the originators, Major Christina Schweiss (formerly of the Social Sciences Department), Ms. Andrea Strimling (FMCS), and Professor Andrea Bartoli (CICR) is that the program will ultimately not only train young officers to win without fighting but will also contribute to Military/NGO understanding through an ever-increasing number of interactions between military students and NGO instructors.  As the program matures, it has the potential to be included in some form in every U.S. Army and USMC officer basic and advanced course.

A second project that grew out of the “New Paths to Peace” Conference is one AICPR calls “Peacegaming.” Noting that Washington is a place people come together for a myriad of meetings and conferences where they pass like ships in the night and usually accomplish very little, AICPR decided to attempt to apply military techniques of wargaming to preventing and resolving violent conflict.  Since the spring of 2004, AICPR has hosted a number of workshops and planning sessions supported by the Stimson Center, the National Defense University, and the Foreign Service Academy to design a pilot peacegame that will contribute to Military/NGO collaboration in a real-world effort to prevent violent conflict.  The key to this effort has been the desire to overcome a major shortcoming of sophisticated wargames sponsored by the U.S. Military at great monetary cost-the failure to bring in NGOs and international organization (IO) representatives at the scenario-building stage.  The fact is that NGOs, and to a lesser extent IOs, are normally the first in and the last out of any theatre of potential violence.  The use of military force usually comes after an extended period of NGO involvement during which they build up great knowledge and expertise that, when ignored by scenario writers, makes for an artificial, even dangerously-flawed game in preparation for battle. 

This effort culminated in a roundtable at the Foreign Service Academy in May 2005 that focused on collecting information to design a game exercising the prevention of violent conflict in the small West-African country of Guinea-Bissau.  This roundtable, paid for by the Compton Foundation, included representatives from the NGO community, the Department of Defense (including EUCOM and JFCOM J9) the Department of State (including the Africa Bureau, the American Embassy in Dakar, Senegal, and S/CRS), the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program and, most importantly, Guinea-Bissau civil society  and Government.[15]  An AICPR member, the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland (CIDCM), used the input derived from the roundtable to create a conflict prevention game scenario for Guinea-Bissau.  The next step will be to actually “play” the game once AICPR raises sufficient funds or finds an official sponsor willing to share the cost estimated to be no more than $100,000.

The Peacegame relates directly to another conflict prevention activity in which AICPR has been heavily involved, the International Peace and Prosperity Project for Guinea-Bissau (IPPP-GB).  This project owes its existence to a retired businessman from Massachusetts, Mr. Milton Lauenstein.  A few years ago, Mr. Lauenstein started looking into the realm of conflict prevention and, despite being quite impressed with the quality of human resources being utilized by NGOs and academic institutions, recognized an amazing amount if inefficiency and lack of cooperation compared with the commercial enterprises where he had been so successful.  Eventually, he decided to try to show that with proper organization, it should be possible, at great savings in lives and treasure, to prevent mass, organized violence.  With a small group of academics and practitioners he had assembled, Lauenstein began the search with for an appropriate test case.  He chose as Technical Advisor for the project the noted scholar Michael Lund and for Project Director the experienced practitioner Benjamin Hoffman.  Lund gave Carleton University in Canada a set of parameters for the search that can be roughly summed up as:

• A country that has not yet fallen into mass violence but appears headed in that direction within 2-5 years
• A country that is not of strategic interest to major powers and, hence, is mostly neglected by them and international organizations making it possible for a small NGO-like effort to have a significant impact
• A country that is small and poor enough where a moderate investment of money and human resources, intelligently-employed, could help the population avoid the apparently impending tragedy

            Ultimately, Guinea-Bissau was selected as the test case, and Ben Hoffman has subsequently conducted extensive assessments of the situation and, with great flexibility, has reacted with small but strategically-timed infusions of resources to help the country get past rough spots like national elections last summer that could have proven a trigger to the outbreak of violence.[16]  This author would generally describe the guiding principles of IPPP-GB as:

• Get in early (estimated 2-5 years from likely start of mass violence)
• Make a detailed assessment with an interdisciplinary team of experts
• Identify key Bissauan players who will lead the effort and make it local
• Think long-term and keep focused, but be prepared to react to sudden threats without sacrificing everything to putting out brushfires
• Take a holistic approach building in multi-sectoral/multi-disciplinary collaboration
• Build upon interim successes by garnering more international support, thereby leveraging the limited Lauenstein resources
• Stay involved for as long as it takes to help local leaders create alternative, non-violent mechanisms by which potentially violent conflict can be transformed

            So what, one might ask, can or should the U.S. (or any interested) Military do to help, and what does this have to do with Peacegaming?  As discussed previously, the May 2005 Roundtable attended by people with expertise in Guinea-Bissau and/or conflict prevention in general, provided the CIDCM scholars with the detailed knowledge they needed to write a realistic scenario that includes military activity/assistance.

            The “can” is pretty easy to identify, and would be played in the game.  First, the only national seaport has been blocked to shipping for three decades, ever since independence fighters sunk two ships at the mouth of the harbor to hinder reinforcements from the colonial power.  IPPP-GB believes that any modern Western Navy with a salvage capability could open the harbor relatively easily thereby not only helping the country economically but also giving the population a visible sign that better days are a possibility.  Playing this salvage activity in the peacegame could be a precursor to the actual operation which could be justified as important training in salvage operations.

            Another game activity that could be transformed into reality would be the downsizing and professionalization of the Guinea-Bissauan Army.  Currently, it has approximately 9,000 poorly-equipped and ill-trained soldiers.  Military experts with experience in demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR), with whom IPPP-GB has consulted, estimate that the country requires a security force (Army and Police) closer to 3,000.   DDR coupled with job creation projects related to the reopening of the harbor would be a great boost to the stability of Guinea-Bissau.  A smaller, but more professional force could also be an attractive addition to United Nations or African Union peacekeeping operations.

            The “why” the U.S. or any other professional Western military might want to game and then carry out these activities in collaboration with a civilian conflict prevention effort like the IPPP-GB is also really not difficult to comprehend.  While Guinea-Bissau is tiny (population approximately 1.5 million), it is located in a volatile part of West Africa where off-shore oil is beginning to be a factor.  If Guinea-Bissau or any of its neighbors becomes a failed state, there could be regional ramifications.  Also, while the potential for mass violence in the country is primarily ethnic (95% of the Army belongs to the Balanta ethnic group which represents only 30% of the total population); religiously, the population is almost evenly divided between Muslims and Christians.  In short, an outbreak of mass violence and resulting destabilization in Guinea-Bissau is certainly not in the best interests of any well-meaning country.  Consequently, since the IPPP-GB is laying out a rational roadmap for preventing mass violence in the country, and relatively cheap (relative even to providing humanitarian aid in case of war and possible destabilizing population displacement to neighboring countries) military assistance could help, what is there to lose?  This could be a place where there is a nexus of National and humanitarian NGO interests and an excellent pilot for civil/military engagement in peacegaming that could then be applied to many other countries.      
           
Conclusion:

            This paper has only scratched the surface of the transition that is taking place in relationships among NGOs and military forces.  There are numerous NGOs and academic programs that are studying and promoting this new avenue to preventing violent conflict.[17]Collaboration has worked in natural disasters and sometimes even in time of war.  Now is the time to make it work in preventing war as often as possible.  In many cases, military forces with the blessing of their national civilian leadership may be able to take relatively inexpensive steps to assist NGOs in heading off mass violence.  Soldiers, with their NGO and IO counterparts, can practice collaboration using peacegaming just as the armed services have for years practiced fighting jointly in wargames.  There will never be a “Goldwater-Nichols” mandating jointness among NGOs and the Military, but NGOs can become part of our joint thinking nevertheless.    

 

William A. Stuebner; United States; United States Joint Forces Command, J9, Joint Experimentation; E-Mail William.Stuebner@je.jfcom.mil; Telephone 1-757-203-3237

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