Violence Prevention Articles & Essays

“It’s still the same old story, a fight for love and glory …”

As a young man, I read Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War. I was struck with how much the actions of leaders then, as they led their people into bloody conflicts, resembled those of modern heads of state. The obvious conclusion was that in the last 2500 years, man has learned essentially nothing about how to avoid the tendency of groups undertaking to kill each other in a never-ending quest for power and status. The fact that millions of people have been killed by other people, and that the killing persists has never stopped bothering me.

In a world of accomplishments unimaginable in Thucydides’ day in many other fields, this lack of progress in political science is hard to understand. The amount of resources dedicated to finding new and more destructive ways of killing each other and the things we have built is shocking! While much, much less, the resources devoted to achieving a peaceful world are very large – surely large enough to achieve more than has been accomplished. I find it impossible to believe that man is not capable of reducing the extent to which people organize to kill each other. This thought has been with me for decades, during which my primary attention was directed to other things.

Early in 2001, about the time of my 75^th birthday, I found that I had enough time and money to attempt to try to contribute to ameliorating this sad state of affairs. Against the advice of my wife and close friends, who believed that progress in this field was not possible, I embarked on a mission to see what I could contribute to a reduction of organized violence in the world. I, too, was skeptical about whether one person with limited means could have any real impact on a problem as old as humanity. However, I reasoned that if I did nothing, I certainly would accomplish nothing. So, I plunged into what has been a most interesting and exciting activity.

Prior to 2001, almost the only knowledge I had of political science was what I had gathered from the popular news media. I had never taken a single academic course on the subject. Clearly, if I hoped to make a contribution in this field, I would have to learn something about it.

I immediately started a self-education program. From the beginning, professionals in the field were most helpful. People such as Mary Anderson of Collaborative Action, Kennette Benedict of the McArthur Foundation, Karen Colvard of the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, Mari FitzDuff of Brandeis University, Necla Tschirgi of the International Peace Academy introduced me to colleagues, invited me to meetings, recommended books, and provided valuable advice. Within 5 years, I had read well over 100 books on the subject, attended many meetings, joined organizations, became acquainted with a great many people in the field, and sponsored different kinds of projects.

My primary vocational back ground was in industrial management. I had been president or chairman of several small corporations and had taught business part time at the Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago and at Northeastern University. I came from a world in which leaders ask themselves each morning, “What can I do today to achieve better results?”

I found that the world of political science is strikingly different. There is an enormous amount written about organized violence, but little that is likely to lead to effective action. Almost all of what I read was either descriptive of what existed, or dealt with what could or should be done, but with no attention whatsoever to what might motivate whom to respond to the recommendations. The more I read, the more I became impatient with the use of the passive voice and the absence of concrete plans to act to prevent violence. The authors seemed not to realize that to influence actual events, they needed to present a plan specifying who was to do what, when and why. They seemed to assume that if they had a good idea, someone, somewhere would read about it and find a way to implement it. Unfortunately, that doesn’t happen very often.

My first thought had been that by sponsoring research work on the causes of, and possible cures for, organized violence, I could contribute to reducing organized violence. I did in fact sponsor some research projects. However, while more knowledge is always potentially useful, much of the research I read about seemed to have very little chance of becoming practically useful. For example, I couldn’t see how research into what sort of childhood experiences brutal dictators had had could be applied to reducing organized violence, interesting though it may be. Moreover, I became convinced that in this field, lack of knowledge is not the main problem. It appeared that enough knowledge and skills needed to reduce violence were already available, but that society was not organized to use them effectively. Therefore, I abandoned my thoughts of funding more research, and turned my attention to the challenge of promoting practical actions that could be expected to contribute more directly to reducing violence.

To help identify actions I could take that would offer a reasonable chance of reducing violence, I organized small meetings of leading professionals to discuss what might usefully be done. I sponsored a contest run by Columbia University for papers on practical steps that would reduce violence. My involvement in the research projects already mentioned also contributed to my knowledge of the field, and thus to acquiring some ability to judge what could be effective.

In the late ‘90s, The Carnegie Corporation sponsored a blue ribbon commission on the prevention of deadly conflict. Its Report was excellent, except, like so many others, it didn’t go so far as to present a plan of action. Recently, one of the distinguished commissioners wrote to me that so far as he was aware, the  activity, which had cost millions, had had no real effect “whatever”. For all of the millions it cost, and for all of the talent that went into the work, the project never got down to developing plans of action that would lead to practical results.

In addition to the report, the commission sponsored the writing of a number of books on the subject. Two of them, The Costs of Conflict and The Price of Peace, helped to convince me that prevention is much more cost-effective than dealing with violence after it has erupted, to say nothing of the deaths and suffering caused by war. So I began focusing on the question of how I could contribute to preventing violence.

Not only do adequate knowledge and skills already exist for addressing successfully the potential for violence, but there is no shortage of other resources needed to get the job done. The amount of money and effort devoted to “the peace movement” is enormous. I have been greatly impressed with the number of highly intelligent, energetic and dedicated professionals that there are in the field. But I was also struck with the disastrous lack of organization that is impeding the achievement of practical results.

Literally thousands of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are devoted to actions addressing one segment or another of what could be an integrated program to prevent violence, including conflict resolution, mediation, education for peace, arms control, security, the reduction of the poverty that can lead to violence, better governance, and others. But there is little coordination of their activities, no setting of priorities, and no integration.

NGOs vigorously compete with each other for funding at the same set of potential donors. Many are committed to a particular approach and refuse to support alternatives. In their competition for funds, they flock to places in the news, places in which violence has already broken out. As a senior official in one large donor organization told me, there is no chance of getting the directors of a foundation to appropriate money to support a long-term project at a place no one ever heard of, where the objective was no noticeable result (no violence).

The obvious sources of potential preventive action would seem to be the UN and the US. Except for the UN peacekeeping activities, which have been initiated only after violence has occurred, neither has been effective in preventing violence. Political considerations and constraints seem to prevent either organization from mobilizing its resources to prevent violence before it has occurred. The world has been appalled as these organizations have failed to act while thousands have been slaughtered in Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and many other places.

One approach to prevention has been recommended by a number of professional authors, but, until recently, had never been tried. It involves identifying a vulnerable place well ahead of actual widespread violence, working with local leadership to determine what is required, obtaining the needed help from the most appropriate sources, and continuing the program for however many years are needed to develop a sufficiently stable situation that violence becomes highly unlikely.

One of the groups I had formed, called “The Reducing Political Violence Action Group”, came up with a plan which I proceeded to fund. It was to select an appropriate place to initiate a “test case” to demonstrate what could be achieved using the approach just mentioned to prevent violence. It developed criteria for selecting the place and commissioned Carleton University to gather data and to make recommendations. Based on their work, it selected Guinea-Bissau in West Africa for the project, which we called the “International Peace and Prosperity Project” (IPPP). The country was desperately poor, the government was weak, and violence was widely expected to erupt. It had the advantage of being unknown to most, so that there was almost no activity there by NGOs, so that IPPP could expect its influence to be felt.

Two of the members of the group, whom I had come to know and respect, agreed to lead the project. Ben Hoffman, who had had considerable field experience with The Carter Center, and Michael Lund, an international authority on violence prevention, agreed to lead the project.  Dr. Hoffman is the Project Manager, while Dr. Lund serves as Technical Advisor.

The first visit of the project team to Guinea-Bissau was scheduled for August, 2004.  In the process of arranging for introductions there, we became aware that August was in the middle of the rainy season, and that many of the people we wanted to meet would not be there then, so the trip was postponed until October. Then, shortly before the group was to leave, a group of soldiers mutinied, took the head of the army hostage, and then killed him. We considered canceling the trip, but since more violence did not break out immediately, and people who knew the country thought that it would be safe, the team went anyway, and met no violence. An IPPP team has visited there repeatedly since then.

Originally, we considered establishing a continuing presence in Bissau, the capitol, which I planned to fund. After visiting a couple of times, however, Dr. Hoffman decided that having an IPPP office there would detract from the basic idea of leadership by local people, so we decided not to do so. The IPPP role was to encourage local people to solve their problems themselves, with our acting as a sort of catalyst, and helping to obtain whatever assistance they needed from the best available sources.

The new head of the army, General Tagme, felt that the proper role of the army was to stay out of politics, and instead, to support civilian government. We encouraged him to pursue that policy, and he has done so. We have responded to his request for expert advice by bringing in capable retired senior military officers from other countries, which he has appreciated. In recent months, when violence threatened, he has steadfastly held to his policies, has supported the civilian government, and has helped to maintain the peace.

In April, IPPP arranged a meeting of the heads of most of the civil society organizations of the country to help get a consensus as to how we could be most helpful. At the meeting, the group decided to form a task force, and elected one of the group, a remarkable woman named Macaria Barai, as chairperson. Since an upcoming national election was widely expected to trigger violence, they decided that their first priority would be to work for an orderly, peaceful election. IPPP provided encouragement and modest financial support. The task force drew up a “code of conduct” for the candidates to sign, in which they agreed to refrain from the kinds of words and actions that might provoke violence. It launched a campaign to promote an orderly election, including radio ads, banners, T-shirts, and, of course, enlisting the help of their organizations across the country. It also had the support of the army.

The election was held in June, 2005. Over 85% of the eligible voters turned out. Surprising those who know the situation, the election was a success. Because none of the candidates won a majority, a run-off between the top two vote-getters, held in July, was also orderly. The new president was inaugurated on October 1.

I went with the project team to Guinea-Bissau for the first time in June of 2005. I was impressed both by the ability, cooperation, and determination of the local people and with how little they have to work with. A war in 1998-9 destroyed 80 % of the already tiny economy, so the country is desperately poor. But, if violence can be averted, it appears that there are many opportunities for economic development that can be exploited with relatively little investment. While poverty, corruption, tribalism, and governmental weakness continue to make the situation vulnerable, the stage is now set for the various actors to work together with continuing help from IPPP to build a peaceful and more prosperous country.

Regardless of what transpires in Guinea-Bissau in the future, what I saw on my trip there convinces me that the approach being used there is sound and much more cost-effective than massive inputs of money and people trying to tell local people what to do. It was designed as a demonstration project and the experience there will help others design more effective violence prevention projects in other places. The continuing IPPP story is to be reported and disseminated widely for that purpose. While I am continuing to fund the project alone, it will soon outgrow my ability to do so, so Dr. Hoffman is actively seeking other sources of support. IPPP is so promising that I hope very much that he is successful.

In my reading, I became aware that in many places, local people, faced with the prospect of violence, had found ways, suited to the local situation, to avoid it. Many of these actions involved very little money, and thus were very cost-effective. I contacted the American Friends’ Service Committee (Quaker) and Pax Christi (Roman Catholic) and offered to support such efforts as they could recommend. Through these organizations, I have funded local projects in South America and in Africa. Both organizations are aware of my interest in funding additional projects that they can recommend, based on their knowledge of the local situations and people.

Because lack of integration and cooperation among those working for peace is such a serious problem, I was drawn to the idea of getting a group of international organizations and experts together to plan joint actions they would commit to implement together. I found that the then executive director of the Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Bill Stuebner, shared my view, so we set about arranging such a meeting. Bill got into contact with the Belfast Local Strategy Partnership, which agreed to share the expense with me, even though the subject was to be violence prevention world-wide, with no special focus on Northern Ireland. By the end of the first three-day meeting held in Belfast in December, 2004, the participants had formed several committees to pursue projects that seemed likely to help in the prevention of inter-group violence. At the next meeting, in May 2005, also in Belfast, the participants decided to form an organization called the International Conflict Prevention Consortium (ICPC) to continue the work. Dan Smith of International Alert and Liam Maskey of Intercomm were elected as co-chairs.

ICPC projects in progress or under consideration include:

• The Consortium is considering how best to collect and to disseminate early warning information from the best sources.
  
• Members are seeking ways to link effective responses to early warnings.
  
• Member organizations are planning a collaborative project to help another fragile state, Guinea, to avoid potential violence.
  
• The Consortium is exploring the possibility of developing a regional West African prevention program.
  
• The Consortium is exploring the possibility of developing a regional West African prevention program, in which IPPP and the collaborative initiative in Guinea may represent the first examples.
  
• Members are seeking donors to fund these initiatives and to promote more collaboration among actors.
  

I am continuing to provide funding to ICPC because it represents so much potential for improving the effectiveness of violence prevention activities.

Still another activity to which I contributed some seed money is very promising. Arguably, the most successful violence prevention program the world has ever seen was the work done by Max van der Stoel as High Commissioner on National Minorities in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). He contributed directly to preventing impending violence in the Baltic states, Macedonia, Moldova, and elsewhere. Based on that success, he and his former chief of staff, John Packer, are encouraging other regional multinational organizations to establish similar offices to prevent violence in their regions. I was so impressed with this idea that I and a Japanese friend funded the first two interns in regional organizations to help get the project started.

One of the reasons I have chosen the projects that I am funding is that unlike many other initiatives, these are likely to “do no harm”, to use the title of Mary Anderson’s book. In many cases, gifts intended to provide humanitarian aid have been diverted either to line the pockets of corrupt politicians or, worse still, to fund violence. When large quantities of food are shipped into a country, prices sometimes fall so low that local farmers abandon their farms, no longer able to make a living. When large organizations come into a poor country, they hire many of the ablest of the local people, denuding government and the economy of their most important resource. Foreign aid can support a whole new “industry”, thus providing local governments and business people an incentive to prolong the problems that occasioned the influx of so much money. The book “The Road to Hell” and others I have read present many actual case studies of the harm done by many well-meaning projects. More modest initiatives, led by responsible local people, can avoid such unintended consequences.

My venture into a world with which I was hardly aware until 5 years ago has been interesting, exciting, and rewarding. In the beginning, I couldn’t believe that one individual with a limited budget could have any real impact in an effort in which man has made so little progress over the centuries. However, as I got better acquainted with the field and the people in it, I became convinced that the effort I was making could produce a worthwhile result. The demonstration project in Guinea-Bissau promises to encourage others to pursue a more effective approach to helping fragile countries avert disaster and rebuild. ICPC, with its new leadership, is pursuing initiatives which have the potential to make an important improvement in violence prevention activities. Similarly, the effort to establish violence prevention offices in regional multinational organizations will save many lives even if only partially as successful as the one in OSCE.

At a meeting in New York, I happened to meet one of the “Indigenous Guards” I had helped to fund in Colombia through AFSC. Hearing directly from him what they had been doing to protect themselves, successfully and non-violently, also helped to make me feel that the effort was worth all I have put into it. It is now clearer to me than in the beginning why I am funding violence prevention activities.

It is no longer “still the same old story”. Recent studies have produced convincing data indicating that the number and intensity of violent situations has declined sharply since the early ‘90s. Clearly, this at least partially reflects preventive actions that have been taken, including some of those mentioned above. This gives me hope that in fact, man can reduce the extent to which groups of people set about savaging their fellow men. It gives me hope that what I have been doing is not foolish, but that it can actually contribute to saving lives and suffering of fellow human beings. What could be more exciting and satisfying?

Milt Lauenstein
October 22, 2005