Violence Prevention Articles & Essays

Recently, Martin Griffiths has written an excellent paper on UN mediation, stressing the importance of the maverick qualities that are inherent, in his estimation, in effective mediators*. As someone who has mediated at the Track I level, working to reach and implement peace accords, I agree with Griffiths. Low-powered, neutral mediation and a lack of creativity and drive will not get the job done. And I have now come to recognize the importance of these maverick qualities as they apply to the prevention of violence in the first place. Indeed, there is a need for the “peace guerilla” in violence prevention.

What is a “peace guerilla”? And why are they needed? Let me explain.

With private funding from Mr. Milt Lauenstein, a number of senior practitioners in conflict resolution and peacebuilding have been working to prevent armed violence in Guinea-Bissau. This small West African country was selected by Dr. David Carment and colleagues at Carleton University, Ottawa, as a country in which we could demonstrate the strengths (and weaknesses) of a prevention initiative that applies lessons learned and best practices. Guinea-Bissau would be a “test case” for prevention that is early, holistic, vertically and horizontally integrated, and sustained; but especially, our effort would identify local leadership and we would work primarily as a catalyst to identify needs and mobilize resources on the basis of sound analysis of the forms and causes of violence.

Nine months into a dynamic, new violence prevention intervention, a team of five of us recently visited Guinea-Bissau on the eve of its highly contested, potentially violent presidential election. Mr. Lauenstein came along to see what we were doing with his investment in prevention, and the professionals involved on this mission were Dr. Michael Lund (USA), retired Brigadier Vere Hayes (UK), Mr. Jeff Mapendere (USA), and myself. We were accompanied by a two-person documentary film crew that had begun some months earlier to follow my work in peacebuilding, with a particular focus on reconciliation.

Just prior to lift-off from Canada to France, where all seven of us would meet en route to Dakar and then Bissau, I was struggling with how we could describe to the film crew what we were actually doing in Guinea-Bissau. What made it different or even unique as a violence prevention initiative? What was our goal? What was our modus operandi?”

Now, the original model we had adopted, based on a solid review of lessons learned and guided by Michael Lund, was to engage all the key stakeholders in a facilitated joint diagnostic of the conflicts in the country and to jointly design a plan to prevent violence and build sustainable peace. This approach in itself was not new, perhaps, as there is a strong history of efforts at multi-stakeholder, multi-issue consensus building; and a good number of peacebuilding efforts have been trying to improve the coordination of action.

But our approach would try to overcome the shortcomings of other efforts, along these lines: we would not offer a particular service and get caught in the “mandate trap” that so many other NGOs and UN agencies do; we would not prescribe but elicit solutions; we would not establish a country office but support local actors to take leadership; we would not focus on one sector, or even on those sectors commonly associated with peace and development, while ignoring others, especially the security sector and elite actors whose machinations were whip lashing the country from violent pillar to violent post; and we would advocate for peace, lobbying at the regional and international levels in New York , Washington and wherever needed. The idea was to be active across all sectors, facilitating horizontal integration; and to likewise be active from the community level through local NGOs to the executive offices of the World Bank and other relevant institutions, seeking vertical integration.

But, as with so many best intentions and theoretically sound designs, reality on the ground dictated modification. And these modifications would be needed immediately.

The head of the armed forces had been assassinated in October, 2004, just prior to our first “scouting mission’ to the country to confirm Dr. Carment’s selection of Guinea-Bissau. And with that assassination and the upcoming presidential election, we had to move to a crisis management mode rather than have the audacity to try to impose our joint diagnostic multi-stakeholder process on the country. People who knew Guinea-Bissau, external actors from UN agencies and donor embassies, scholars inside and outside the country, and the people in the country had been quick to tell us exactly what was needed. There was an urgent need for security sector reform, for dealing with an economic crisis and long-term development, for improving governance, and supporting the growth of an active civil society. But most importantly, there was a need to stabilize the country. Politicians were mobilizing discontent and inter-ethnic hostilities. Mass violence was possible.

Indeed, the army had a practice of being deeply immersed in politics, with a history of coup d’etats, assassinations, and a full-scale war in 1998. We were told that doing things to keep the army out of politics and building what someone called a “contre pouvior” (a mobilized, influential civil society) to those with guns - were immediate priorities.

Guinea-Bissau was on the verge of erupting or imploding and our lessons-learned, inspired approach to violence prevention would not apply. If we were unable to respond to these needs, if we had insisted that our original model was the only way to proceed, if we have been constrained by the nature of our mandate and the funding we had, we would have had to go home.

We decided otherwise. It was apparent that we needed to be responsive, dexterous, and deliver concrete actions or services in the now clearly defined immediate areas of need: the role of the armed forces in Guinea-Bissau and the role of civil society.

This “emergency room” diagnostic, which also recognized how critical to peace the machinations of political elites were, plunged us into a set of actions that were strategically-informed, but carried out in a way that surely must have confused some of the other members of the peacebuilding community, including the INGOs and UN actors already on the ground. And while we had named our project the International Peace and Prosperity Project to demonstrate that we had indeed listened and knew that both economic development and conventional peacebuilding were required, we focused mostly in this critical period on the peace agenda. And we resisted being stereotyped as a provider of a singular program or service.

We also had the good fortune to meet Ms. Macaria Barai and her colleagues in the nascent nongovernmental sector in Guinea-Bissau. We had found local leadership that managed to be sufficiently nonpartisan in a very politicized country and we chose to work with and through them.

What did we do? How was it different? And how did the term “Peace Guerilla” come to describe us?

First, we forged a relationship with the newly installed head of the armed forces, General Tagme, especially because he was talking publicly about the need for reconciliation of factions within the armed forces. This was powerful language in a country wracked by a pattern of attack and revenge. While we were not inclined to be a granting body in the usual sense, and because we did not have large sums of money to issue as grants in any case, we were able to direct small amounts of money to the military in very short order to do simple things that might persuade otherwise discontented soldiers that remaining loyal to Tagme and acting professionally, staying out of politics this time, was worth it. And when we convened a meeting of some fourteen representatives of civil society around the issue of “reconciliation” and they were moved to form a Task Force that would mobilize the citizenry around a fair and free presidential election, we could offer a small grant that would give them the resources to get started immediately. We were not encumbered with a bureaucratic process of reviewing grant applications, and we were able to direct small amounts of money to strategically identified areas on a “just in time” basis. We hoped, of course, and we lobbied that the UN and country donors would eventually come through on long-term funding that would make structural change possible.

We also mobilized at the regional and international level, writing letters on behalf of Guinea-Bissau, trying to get it on the radar screen of agencies and institutions whose engagement was necessary. We wrote and disemminated professional papers that quickly introduced Guinea-Bissau, clarified the issues and needs, and invited action. We wrote letters to the editors of newspapers to mobilize resources for the election. We commissioned a body of international legal scholars to write a neutral option about a controversial matter bearing on the election and before the Supreme Court in Guinea-Bissau. And we invited local leaders to travel abroad to tell others about their country and to request assistance.

So, as the film crew began to prepare itself to document these actions and human stories in Guinea-Bissau, I was pressed to explain who we were and what we were doing. I thought about how our efforts were always informed by moment-to-moment conflict analysis, by a deep probing of violence and the role of power in Guinea-Bissau, about the immediacy and dexterity of our actions, about our moving across sectors horizontally and within sectors, vertically, to encourage integration of effort. It struck me that we were “peace guerillas”. Like guerilla warriors we tried to “hit” strategically identified “targets”. We were mobile, we were light on our feet, administratively and physically, we were active through collaborators and we were focused on one objective: that we would prevent mass violence.

So I told the film crew we were “peace guerillas”. The label seemed to fit. The film crew has adopted it as the working title of their film. And like Martin Griffiths, I have come to recognize that we must embrace the qualities and modus operandi of both the “maverick mediator” and the “peace guerilla” if we are to be effective in achieving our ultimate goal: peace.

But there are downsides.

The downside to acting as a “peace guerilla” is running the risk of being misperceived by others, foreshortening the full response that is needed to prevent violence. The “peace guerilla” may be seen as impulsive, reactive, and his or her commitment to long-term violence prevention and peacebuilding “processes” could be misunderstood. A “peace guerilla” is obviously working outside the normal cycle of donor funding and peacebuilding programming. This can make other needed partners in violence prevention uneasy as the “guerilla” is seen moving quickly, appearing here and there, possibly even messing up the tidy world of larger organizations and systems.

The “peace guerilla” may not be seen as acting in a disciplined way. The analysis of need and the identification of required accomplishments needed now to stabilize a violent situation, to build the basis for further, deeper prevention work, may not be as obvious or as urgent to others as it is the “peace guerilla”. This can give others pause, and even a reason to dismiss this type of “maverick” activity.

While working hard to forge and mobilize partnerships, and wanting to achieve short –to- intermediate goals so that long-term sustainable peace may be built, the “peace guerilla” may be reluctantly accepted by other actors in the peacebuilding community but only on a short-term basis.

The “guerrilla’s” refusal to stake out territory, to be seen to offer a singular service or to have a conventional “model” of operating, can make others uncertain of the professionalism and predictability of the “guerilla”, thereby reducing the ease with which others might engage with the “guerrilla”.

There is also the simple fact that an effective “peace guerilla” may cause jealously and resentment in others who, because of who they are and what they do, cannot achieve what the guerrilla does.

Being aware of these “downsides”, however, should not discourage appropriate people at appropriate times from taking on the role of a “peace guerilla”. Strategically-informed, quickly executed actions that mobilize needed resources to achieve stability and build the basis for locally owned long-term violence prevention programming is absolutely necessary in potentially volatile situations.

Antidotes to being misperceived, misused or mistreated are necessary. Ultimately, both local actors, whether government officials, the military or civil society as well as other providers of peacebuilding services must trust the “peace guerilla”.

Some ways in which the “peace guerilla” can neutralize potential downsides, build trust, and achieve maximum value include:

• Having funding and administrative arrangements that allow maximum executive decision-making and flexible operating procedures;
• Demonstrating professional competence in conflict analysis and violence prevention;
• Having no stake in self- or corporate promotion;
• Being an active listener and adjusting priorities and responses to what those who know are saying is needed;
• Being sufficiently transparent to all key stakeholders;
• Putting resources in and providing tangible support to local leadership disposed to nonviolent, practical actions;
• Being comfortable and competent in working in all relevant sectors, including security;
• Being seen to act across sectors, facilitating integration of effort, and vertically within sectors, supporting practical immediate activities at the community and international levels;
• Demonstrating a broad repertoire of competencies and actions, from facilitation to mediation, to violence prevention advocacy, to having the technical know-how of lobbying for action; and
• Remaining engaged.


Ben Hoffman, Ph.D.,
Director,
International Peace and Prosperity Project
2005

* Talking Peace in a Time of Terror: United Nations Mediation and Collective Security By Martin Griffiths, March 2005, available for download here: http://www.hdcentre.org/datastore/shaping%20opinion/Talki...